Arrow's Impossibility Theorem is false if the set of agents is infinite

Oct. 28, 2013

This is a standard result which I had heard about and mentioned in my earlier post on Arrow’s Theorem. Fishburn’s paper where this was first proven is behind an Elsevier paywall, but the result does not seem too hard to prove. Here is an attempt.

UPDATE (2013/10/29). Got a look at Fishburn. He doesn’t mention ultrafilters by name but uses the equivalent formulation of a finitely additive 0-1 probability measure. Apparently a better reference for the ultrafilter treatment is Kirman, Alan P., and Dieter Sondermann. “Arrow’s theorem, many agents, and invisible dictators.” Journal of Economic Theory 5, no. 2 (1972): 267-277, but that too is behind a paywall.

The existence of non-principal ultrafilters

Let XX be the set of agents which is infinite. Let \mathscr{F} be the collection of subsets of XX whose complements are finite. This is a filter. It dosen’t contain the null set since XX is infinite (this is the crucial step that will not work for a finite set). The other filter properties are easy to check.

We know from the ultrafilter lemma (which is an easy consequence of Zorn’s Lemma) that there exists an ultrafilter 𝒰\mathscr{U} over XX of which \mathscr{F} is a subset. For every αX\alpha \in X the set {α}c\{\alpha\}^c belongs to \mathscr{F} and hence 𝒰\mathscr{U}. Since a filter contains either a set or its complement {α}𝒰\{\alpha\} \notin \mathscr{U}.

Thus 𝒰\mathscr{U} is not a principal ultrafilter.

Definition of social preference relation

We choose some non-principal ultrafilter 𝒰\mathscr{U} over XX (we have shown that at least one exists) and keep it fixed for the rest of our analysis.

For any alternatives xx and yy we specify the social preference xyx \succ y if and only if there is a set A𝒰A \in \mathscr{U} such that xαyx \succ_\alpha y for all α𝒰\alpha \in \mathscr{U}.

We show that the social preference relation defined thus satisfies the conditions for a strong ordering.

Asymmetric: xyyxx \succ y \Rightarrow y \nsucc x

Suppose there are two alternatives xx and yy such that both xyx \succ y and yxy \succ x. Then there must exist sets AA and BB in 𝒰\mathscr{U} such that xαyx \succ_\alpha y for all αA\alpha \in A and yβxy \succ_\beta x for all βB\beta \in B. Since 𝒰\mathscr{U} is a filter, (AB)(A \cap B) lies in 𝒰\mathscr{U} and is nonempty. For agents γ\gamma in this set we must have both xγyx \succ_\gamma y and yγxy \succ_\gamma x which is not possible by the asymmetry of individual preferences.

Negatively transitive: xyx \nsucc y and yzy \nsucc z implies xzx \nsucc z.

For any two alternatives uu and vv we define the set P(u,v)={ξXuξv}.P(u,v) = \{\xi \in X \mid u \succ_\xi v\}. From our defintion of social preferences uvu \succ v iff P(u,v)𝒰P(u,v) \in \mathscr{U}. Since an ultrafilter contains either a set or its complement it follows that uvu \nsucc v iff [P(u,v)]c𝒰[P(u,v)]^c \in \mathscr{U}.

Suppose xyx \nsucc y and yzy \nsucc z. Then [P(x,y)]c𝒰[P(x,y)]^c \in \mathscr{U} and [P(y,z)]c𝒰[P(y,z)]^c \in \mathscr{U}. From the finite intersection property of filters ([P(x,y)]c[P(y,z)]c)𝒰.([P(x,y)]^c \cap [P(y,z)]^c) \in \mathscr{U}. From the negative transitivity of individual preferences [P(x,z)]c([P(x,y)]c[P(y,z)]c)[P(x,z)]^c \supset ([P(x,y)]^c \cap [P(y,z)]^c) We have shown that the set on the right-hand side of the above equation belongs to 𝒰\mathscr{U}. Since a filter contains a set if it contains one of its subsets, it follows that [P(x,z)]c[P(x,z)]^c also belongs to 𝒰\mathscr{U}.

Hence we have shown that xzx \nsucc z.

Arrow’s Conditions

We verify that the social preference relation we have defined satisfies all the four properties that Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem says are impossible to satisfy with a finite set of alternatives with more than two elements.

Paretian Property

Follows from the fact that from the definition of a filter X𝒰X \in \mathscr{U}.

Universal Domain

We have not put any restrictions on individual preferences.

Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives

Our definition of social preferences over alternatives xx and yy makes use of individual preferences only over xx and yy.

Nondictatorial

Consider an arbitrary agent α\alpha. Consider the following pattern of individual preferences xαyyβxβα \begin{align*} x \succ_\alpha y\\ y \succ_\beta x&\qquad \beta \neq \alpha \end{align*}

By construction {α}c𝒰\{\alpha\}^c \in \mathscr{U}. It follows from our definition of social preferences that yxy \succ x. This shows that α\alpha is not a dictator.